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In the spring of 1992, George W. Heintz, a partner in a
small Merrillville, Indiana law firm, received a routine file from
a client, NDB Bank.' The bank had financed Darlene Jenkins'
purchase of a car for her personal use and Jenkins had defaulted
on the loan.2 The bank had repossessed the car and conducted a
sale, but the sale netted less than the balance due on the loan.3
The bank wanted the law firm to recover from Jenkins approxi-
mately $3,000 she owed on the loan, $4,173 for insurance the
bank purchased when Jenkins failed to insure the car, and other
amounts.4 Using the information in the file, Heintz prepared a
summons and complaint. He then forwarded the legal documents
to the bank, asking the bank to verify that the figures were
correct.5 After the bank returned a written verification, Heintz
filed suit.6 Jenkins responded with an answer and a counter-
claim that alleged that the contract between herself and the
Bank did not authorize the Bank to "force place" insurance and
* Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law.
1. See Jenkins v. Heintz, No. 93C1332, 1996 WL 535167, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
18, 1996).
2. See id.
3. See Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824, 826 (7th Cir. 1997).
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pass the cost on to her.7
In July, 1992, Heintz sent Jenkins' attorney a settlement
offer.' Jenkins then sued Heintz and his law firm for violating
the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), which
in pertinent part prohibits debt collectors from attempting to
collect unauthorized amounts.9 Heintz's defense was simple. He
claimed, in effect, "I'm not a [shudder] debt collector trying to
collect a debt. I'm an attorney involved in litigation." The case
went all the way to the United States Supreme Court, which
gave Heintz the surprise of his life.10 In April, 1995, the Court
held unanimously that the FDCPA applies to attorneys such as
Heintz, who never regarded themselves as debt collectors.1
This article explores the ramifications of that decision for
practicing attorneys. Part II briefly discusses common law claims
against debt collectors. Part III examines the holding in Heintz
v. Jenkins and some possible consequences for attorneys as debt
collectors under the FDCPA. Part IV points out the do's and
don'ts of the FDCPA that have particular application to attor-
neys. Part V looks at the liability to which attorneys are exposed
under the FDCPA and the defenses available to them. The arti-
cle concludes by summarizing steps attorneys might take to
comply with the Act.
II. COMMON LAw CLAIMS
Debt collection is big business. There are more than 5,000
debt collection agencies in the United States. In 1995, creditors
turned 383 million accounts aggregating $117 billion over to
them. 2 Debt collectors seem to operate under three premises:
1. Keep your transaction costs low. It is better to collect a
debt by making a telephone call than by initiating a lawsuit.
2. Scare the wits out of the debtor. The more debtors believe
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.; Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994).
This article refers to the statute as the FDCPA or the Act and textual section refer-
ences are to the Act rather the Code.
10. The decisions of the courts on trial, appeal, and remand are: Jenkins v.
Heintz, No. 93C1332, 1993 WL 284115 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1993), Jenkins v. Heintz,
25 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994), Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995), Jenkins v.
Heintz, No. 93C1332, 1996 WL 535167 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1996), Jenkins v. Heintz,
124 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1304 (1998).
11. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
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that terrible things will happen to them if they don't pay their
debts, the more effective the collection efforts will be.
3. Most debtors don't pay their debts because they can't, not
because they are unwilling. Get in fast, for debts become more
difficult to collect as time passes. Because you can't squeeze
blood from a turnip, focus on collectible debts.
The conclusion follows from these premises that when debt col-
lectors are left to their own devices, the harm they do to debtors
may well exceed the benefit to creditors. The economics of debt
collection encourages debt collectors to use quick and dirty
means of collection, even though many of those efforts will prove
fruitless. In an industry with a lot of hunters and little game,
overly aggressive collectors will have a competitive edge. Even
debt collectors using fair and reasonable methods will cause
some inconvenience, embarrassment, or annoyance to the debtor.
The issue is when these methods become actionable.
When the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act became effec-
tive on March 20, 1978, debtors had a federal statutory claim
against debt collectors. Prior to that date, debtors seeking re-
course against debt collectors had to find a basis for a tort claim
in the common law. Common law tort claims against debt col-
lectors have included invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, libel and slander, false imprisonment, mali-
cious prosecution and abuse of process, and assault and bat-
tery."3 Plaintiffs found these claims difficult to prove and, be-
cause of the American Rule that each side pays its own
attorneys' fees, even victorious plaintiffs rarely came out ahead.
Because of these obstacles, successful common law actions were
rare. For example, in Public Finance Corp. v. Davis,14 the debt
collector called and visited Davis' home repeatedly, called Davis
at the hospital when she was visiting her sick daughter, induced
Davis to write a check for the debt by promising not to cash it
until later and then phoned a friend of Davis and informed her
13. See ROBERT J. HOBBS, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION ch. 12, at 339-59 (3d ed.
1996). This manual, published by the National Consumer Law Center, is the best
guide for attorneys handling FDCPA cases. The manual also contains a disk with
checklists and pleadings. Occasionally the Center's pro-consumer views color its inter-
pretation of the statute; the prudent attorney can look at this as the worst that can
happen to her as a debt collector. The Center operates a web site at
<http'/www.consumerlaw.org>. The Federal Trade Commission also has a website at
<http'J/www.ftc.gov> that contains information about collection, but it is not particu-
larly sophisticated.
14. 360 N.E.2d 765 (111. 1976).
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that Davis was writing bad checks." During one visit to the
house, the debt collector asked if he could use the phone to call a
colleague and, once inside, used the telephone to give the col-
league an inventory of Davis' household goods, presumably for
later repossession." Applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts
standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court
found that these acts were not "so outrageous in character and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of de-
cency." 7
Many of the common law privacy cases involved creditors
who made frequent telephone calls to the debtor or who disclosed
information to the debtor's employer.'" Others involved creditors
who placed signs regarding the debt in places where the public
could read them. 9 For example, in Voneye v. Turner,' the debt
collector called and wrote Voneye's employer to disclose the sta-
tus of the debt. Although the court pointed out that public disclo-
sure of a private fact may constitute invasion of the right to
privacy, it found that communications from a debt collector to an
employer are acceptable disclosures; people who do not pay their
debts are protected only from undue or oppressive publicity.
Even after enactment of the FDCPA, the common law still
lives. In a widely publicized 1995 case, a Texas jury awarded $2
million in compensatory damages and $9 million in punitive
damages to a couple because of actions by a debt collector. The
debtors were subject to repeated telephone calls, including 26
phone calls in one two-hour period and eight or nine phone calls
a night. The calls included profanity and at least one death
threat. The debt collector made calls to the debtor's employer,
including a bomb threat to the place of employment. An impor-
tant aspect of the case is that the credit company that retained
the services of the debt collector was held liable for the actions of
its agent. Needless to say, businesses should choose their debt
collectors carefully.2'
15. See Public Finance Corp., 360 N.E.2d at 768.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 767-69 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
18. See HOBBS, supra note 13, §§ 12.3, 12.4.
19. See, e.g., Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967 (Ky. 1927) (store listed debtors on
a 5' x 8' sign in the window); Mason v. Williams Discount Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (store listed names under the heading "NO CHECKS" at
checkout counter in full view of customers).
20. 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951).
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As in the Texas case, the actions of debt collectors may in-
volve criminal acts. Criminal prosecutions arise because, as one
court stated, "Itihe law does not countenance forceful and unlaw-
ful collection even of just debts."22 Following enactment of the
FDCPA, however, criminal prosecutions are rare, perhaps be-
cause the civil penalties sufficiently discourage improper behav-
ior or perhaps because prosecutors spend their scarce resources
fighting more serious crimes. Criminal prosecutions for debt
collection may still be seen in instances of loansharking or the
collection of gambling debts.' Occasionally a thug who shakes
down someone who owes money to his boss is charged with felo-
ny murder. His defense is that he was not engaged in robbery
because what he took from the victim did not belong to the vic-
tim but to his boss. "I may have violated the FDCPA," the perpe-
trator argues, "but I didn't commit robbery." The argument is not
successful.'
III. THE FDCPA
When a substantial imbalance exists between parties and
the common law provides inadequate redress, government fre-
quently intervenes to regulate the transaction. The government
regulation strengthens the hand of the weaker party, providing
in effect the rules that party would have demanded if it had the
bargaining power. Debt collectors and consumer debtors are a
case in point. A few states enacted debt collection statutes to
address the issue; Montana did not. In 1977, Congress enacted
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act as part of the Federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act.' By permitting private
claims-and in fact encouraging them by providing for manda-
tory attorney's fees-the government can stay out of the regula-
tion business, leaving it to the parties to enforce the rules.
The FDCPA states its purpose in a straightforward manner:
It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive
debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those
debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote
consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collec-
22. State v. Richards, 167 P. 47, 48 (Wash. 1917).
23. See HOBBS, supra note 13, § 13.5.
24. See, e.g., Sheckles v. Indiana, 501 N.E.2d 1053 (Ind. 1986) (holding defen-
dant creditor's use of force to collect a secured loan did not negate criminal intent).
25. The FDCPA is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994).
5
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tion abuses.'
While these goals are praiseworthy, the issue is how much regu-
lation is necessary to serve these purposes, especially in a politi-
cal and economic climate in which regulation is appropriately
suspect. This article explores whether application of the statute
to attorneys furthers these regulatory goals or indicates that
enforcement of the statute has taken on a life of its own indepen-
dent of its purposes. We will first look at the structure of the
Act.
The FDCPA is laudably written in plain language.27 It is
written in a clear and coherent manner using words with com-
mon and everyday meanings and is appropriately divided and
captioned by its various sections." As with all statutes, howev-
er, the key to cracking its meaning lies in the definitions. The
Act defines the term "debt collector" to include a person "who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed [to] . . . another."' It does not regulate debt collec-
tion, but debt collectors. Because it applies to debt collectors, the
Act does not apply to a business collecting its own debts unless
that business uses a different name when engaging in debt col-
lection.3' Therefore, the Act does not apply to a law firm or hos-
pital collecting its own receivables. But if St. Mary's Hospital col-
lects its bills under the name of The Hospital Services Company,
then the Act does apply. It applies to a debt collector retained by
the state or federal government to collect debts, but it does not
apply to debts collected by government agencies.3'
When originally enacted in 1977, the FDCPA contained an
express exemption for lawyers. The definition of "debt collector"
provided that the term did not include "any attorney-at-law col-
lecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a
26. FDCPA § 802(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994).
27. Cf Montana Plain Language in Contracts Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-
1101 to -1113 (1997).
28. See FDCPA §§ 802-818, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1994). Section 802 con-
tains the findings and purpose of the Act. Section 803 contains definitions. Sections
804 through 812 contain the do's and don'ts for debt collectors. Section 813 contains
the remedies. Section 814 provides for administrative enforcement by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). The rest is housekeeping.
29. FDCPA § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1994).
30. See FDCPA § 803(6)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6XA) (1994).
31. See FDCPA § 803(6XC), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6XC) (1994). Federal collection
efforts are regulated by the Federal Claims Collection Act and the Debt Collection
Act, as well as umbrella federal regulations and the collecting agency's regulations.
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3711-3720E (1994); 4 C.F.R. pts. 101-105 (1998).
[Vol. 59
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client."" Not surprisingly, attorneys were quick to take advan-
tage of this loophole. Attorneys began increasingly to specialize
in the collection of consumer debts and to own or operate debt
collection agencies. The FTC estimates that half of all debt col-
lectors were attorneys, who sometimes tried to attract customers
by boasting that they had an advantage over other debt collec-
tors because they did not have to comply with the FDCPA."3
When investigating this problem, the FTC probe specifically stat-
ed:
Please note that the inquiry pertains solely to possible abuses
by attorneys who are engaged primarily in the collection of
consumer debts (rather than attorneys who may be engaged in
a conventional law practice entailing the intermittent provision
of collection services on behalf of clients.)4
Responding to the FTC findings of abuses by attorneys, Congress
repealed this exemption in its entirety in 1986."s
The issue then arose whether, in spite of the FTC's limited
intention, the FDCPA applied to attorneys who were not in the
collection business but who nevertheless intermittently engaged
in collection services. The issue came to a head in Heintz v.
Jenkins." To buttress his argument that the Act did not apply
to lawyers whose debt collection activities consisted of litigation
and related settlement efforts, Heintz cited the Act's legislative
history and the FTC Staff Commentary. The Court disparaged
those sources in light of the plain language of the Act.38 It held
that because Congress repealed the attorney exemption without
creating a narrower, litigation-related, exemption, "one would
think that Congress intended that lawyers be subject to the Act
whenever they meet the general 'debt collector' definition." 9
The Act divides its definition of "debt collector" into two
parts.4' The first part-"any person... in any business the
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6XF) (Supp. I 1977).
33. See HOBBS, supra note 13, § 4.2.6.2.
34. Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Montana Legal Services Associa-
tion (Nov. 1, 1985) (on file with author) (emphasis in original).
35. See Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768 (effective July 9, 1986).
36. 514 U.S. 291 (1995).
37. See Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295-98.
38. See id. at 297-98. This jurisprudence may exemplify the Court's recent es-
chewal of legislative history. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
(1997).
39. Heintz, 514 U.S. at 295.
40. Section 803(6) provides in pertinent part that "[t]he term 'debt collector'
means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails
185
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principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts"-is not
applicable to most practicing attorneys such as Heintz. The sec-
ond part of the definition more likely applies to a person whose
primary business is the practice of law-"any person... who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." To
prevent the Act's application, attorneys will seize on the word
regularly, claiming that while they may occasionally collect
debts, they do not regularly do so. One trial court enumerated
factors to be considered in making this determination:
In order to determine whether an attorney is a person who
"regularly" collects debt, the court will take into account the
following factors: the volume of the attorney's collection activi-
ties; the frequency of the use of the collection letter in question;
and whether or not there is found to be an ongoing relationship
between the attorney and the collection agency he represent-
ed.
4 1
Because the purpose of the legislation is to protect consum-
ers, courts may interpret the term broadly, netting attorneys
who collect debts in more than isolated instances, as a minor but
regular part of their practice, or more than a few times a year. If
one attorney in a law firm regularly collects debts for one client,
then that law firm may be held to be a debt collector with regard
to all debts collected. On the other hand, in a recent unreported
decision,42 Montana Federal District Court Judge Hatfield held
that the law firm of Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams did not
regularly collect debts under the following facts:
Defendant [attorney in the firm] maintains she handled only
one other matter involving consumer debt collection in the two
years preceding the events at issue herein. Moreover, the defen-
dant law firm avers that any debt collection matters are a rela-
tively minuscule percentage of the work performed by the firm
during the relevant period. Specifically, of the eighteen mem-
bers of the defendant law firm, only ten percent of one
attorney's practice involves collection and repossession, primari-
ly non-judicial foreclosures of trust indentures on residential
in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who
regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another." FDCPA § 803(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1994).
41. Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Conn. 1990) (citing Crossley v.
Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989)).
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real property.'
The prudent attorney may find it wise to comply with the Act in
the course of her occasional collection efforts rather than claim
later that those efforts were not "regular."
What is a debt under the Act? The FDCPA limits "debt" to
consumer debt, that is, obligations of a natural person "arising
out of... transaction[s]" that "are primarily for personal, fami-
ly, or household purposes."" Because its purpose is consumer
protection, the Act does not apply to the collection of commercial
debt. It also has limited application to the enforcement of a secu-
rity interest against a consumer.'
Many consumers have brought claims under the Act against
debt collectors who were trying to recover on bad checks written
by the consumer.' The debt collectors have raised the defense
that bad checks are not the kind of debt contemplated by the
FDCPA. For example, in a recent Ninth Circuit case,47 the de-
fendant claimed that the FDCPA applied only to debts arising
out of an offer or extension of credit." The court rejected the
argument, holding that the statutory definition of debt"' was
clear: the Act applies to any obligation to pay money.
The definition of debt also includes an alleged obligation to
pay money.' Does this mean that an attorney who writes a de-
mand letter for a client must comply with the Act? For example,
after an insurance company has paid its insured Jones for dam-
ages allegedly caused by Smith in an automobile accident, the
insurance company has a subrogation claim against Smith. Its
43. Id. at 181.
44. FDCPA § 803(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994).
45. Section 803(6) applies the Act to the enforcement of security interests for
the purposes of § 808(6), which makes the following conduct a violation of the Act:
Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession
or disablement of property if-
(A) there is no present right to possession of the property
claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest;
(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the prop-
erty; or
(C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or
disablement.
FDCPA § 808(6), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(b) (1994).
46. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
47. See Charles v. Lundgren & Assoc., 119 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing with
approval Bass v. Stolper, 111 F.3d 1322 (7th Cir. 1997)).
48. See id. at 741.
49. See FDCPA § 803(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994).
50. See FDCPA § 803(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994).
9
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attorney may write a letter to Smith demanding payment to its
client. Whether the attorney is involved in debt collection de-
pends on whether Smith's alleged obligation arose out of a trans-
action "in which the money, property, insurance, or services
which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for person-
al, family, or household purposes," in the words of the statutory
definition of debt.51  Is an automobile accident such a
transaction? The Federal Trade Commission says it is not.52 On
the other hand, a broad reading of the Act indicates that its
purposes are to encourage persons collecting debts to disclose the
nature of their communications and to deter them from engaging
in certain behaviors. These purposes would be served in such a
situation. Even though the claim is a long shot, the prudent
attorney might find complying with the Act more cost effective
than litigating its non-application.
IV. COMPLYING WITH THE FDCPA
The Act is best thought of as a collection of "do's" and
"don'ts'"-things the debt collector must do affirmatively and
things the debt collector must not do. The Act contains only two
affirmative requirements, the "Miranda Warning" and the vali-
dation notice. The prohibitions are numerous. The Act also con-
tains procedural restrictions with which attorneys involved in
debt collection litigation must be aware. We will now examine
these aspects of the Act.
A. Do #1: The Miranda Warning
The Act affirmatively requires that the debt collector dis-
close to the debtor two things: 1) that the debt collector is at-
tempting to collect a debt, and 2) that any information obtained
51. FDCPA § 803(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) (1994).
52. Federal Trade Commission Statements of General Policy or Interpretation
Staff Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,102
(1988), states in pertinent part:
2. Exclusions. The term does not include: Unpaid taxes, fines, alimony,
or tort claims, because they are not debts incurred from a "transaction
(involving purchase of) property . . . or services . . . for personal, family
or household purposes."
The Commentary carries little weight. In Heintz, the Court stated that the Commen-
tary is not binding on the public and is not entitled to deference when it conflicts
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will be used for that purpose.' This disclosure is informally
called the Miranda Warning, for like the notice to arrested per-
sons of their rights, it tells consumers who they are talking to
and what the effect of their conversation might be. Until recent-
ly, circuit courts were split as to whether the disclosures applied
only to the initial communication or to all communications. The
Ninth Circuit was virtually alone in holding that the debt collec-
tor must include the notice in the initial communication but not
in every communication thereafter.' The Ninth Circuit's views
were adopted in a revision of the Act effective for communica-
tions after December 30, 1996:
The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with
the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication
with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication,
that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that
any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the
failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the com-
munication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph
shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a
legal action.'
After the initial communication, subsequent communications
need only make clear that the communication is from a debt
collector. Frequently collection agencies exhaust all means of
debt collection short of litigation before turning the file over to
an attorney to bring suit. The amendment clarifies that, even
though attorneys are debt collectors subject to the Act, an attor-
ney need not include the Miranda Warning in the complaint if
the complaint is the attorney's initial communication.
B. Do #2: Validation Notice
The Act also requires that the debt collector send the con-
sumer certain information regarding the debt in writing either
with the initial communication or within five days after the
initial communication.56 But if the debt collector sends the text
53. See FDCPA § 807(11), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (1994).
54. See Pressly v. Capitol Credit & Collection Serv., Inc., 760 F.2d 922 (9th Cir.
1985).
55. FDCPA § 807(11), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692e(11) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998) (em-
phasis added).
56. See FDCPA § 809(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (1994). The disclosures include:
1. the amount of the debt;
2. the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
11
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as found in the statute, the debt collector may violate the Act!
One court has held that the debt collector must communicate the
notice in a way that is effective for an unsophisticated consumer,
and the statute is not easily comprehensible. 7 The following
plain language version of the notice will probably suffice:
Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this
notice that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion
thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify
this office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice,
this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of
a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verifica-
tion. If you request this office in writing within 30 days after
receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name
and address of the original creditor, if different from the cur-
rent creditor.'
The debt collector should not mislead the consumer into
thinking that the consumer has fewer rights than are stated in
the validation notice, an abuse known as "overshadowing." For
example, in Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc.,"
the debt collector put the required notice in small type and over
it in bold faced type several times larger put this notice:
IF THIS ACCOUNT IS PAID WITHIN THE NEXT 10 DAYS
IT WILL NOT BE RECORDED IN OUR MASTER FILE AS AN
UNPAID COLLECTION ITEM.
A GOOD CREDIT RATING-IS YOUR MOST VALUABLE
ASSET.
The court held that the debt collector violated the Act when it
3. a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after re-
ceipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof,
the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
4. a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disput-
ed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a
judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment
will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
5. a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the
thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the
name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor.
57. See Furth v. United Adjusters, Inc., Clearinghouse No. 35,925 (D. Or. 1983),
cited in HOBBS, supra note 13, §5.7.2.2 n.869.
58. Stephen L. Albrecht, Minimize Risk by Maximizing Compliance, COLLECTOR,
Aug. 1997, at 19.
59. 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988).
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gave the consumer a 10-day notice that conflicted with and over-
shadowed the 30-day notice.'
From the statutory language requiring the debt collector to
cease collection efforts if the consumer responds, it can be im-
plied that the debt collector is not required to cease communica-
tions during the 30-day period if the consumer does not re-
spond."' But if the consumer disputes the debt or requests the
name and address of the original creditor in writing during the
30 days, the debt collector must cease all collection activities
when it receives the communication and cannot resume them
until it sends verification or the address to the consumer.62
Heintz v. Jenkins implies that litigation activities must also
cease during this time.' If the consumer requests verification,
the debt collector complies by sending the debtor the information
it received from the creditor; neither the debt collector nor the
creditor must verify the accuracy of the debt. For example, the
Third Circuit held that computer .printouts containing the
amount of the debt, the date of services provided, and the date
on which the debt was incurred, were sufficient verification.'
Unlike the Miranda Warning, the notice of validation rights
must be sent even if the attorney's initial communication is the
complaint. As noted in Swanson, an attorney may violate the Act
by giving the consumer a deadline that overshadows the 30-day
notice.' Giving the 30-day notice in or with a complaint, but
simultaneously serving a summons that requires an answer in
20 days, may constitute such a violation. This issue is addressed
in an amendment to the Montana Justice and City Court Rules
of Civil Procedure. Effective October 1, 1997, the Rules allow a
defendant 20 days "unless otherwise provided by law" in which
to answer." The Act's 30-day provision is an example of where
a longer period is otherwise provided by law.
60. See Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1226.
61. See FDCPA § 809(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (1994).
62. See FDCPA § 809(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (1994).
63. The Heintz Court allowed some leeway where a statute not originally appli-
cable to attorneys created "anomalous results" when applied to attorneys. Heintz v.
Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1995). The requirement that collection activities cease
seems equally applicable to litigation activities.
64. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991).
65. See Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1226.
66. MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. CIV. P. 5(A) (1997). See also Cynthia Ford, Civil
Practice in Montana's "People's Courts": The Proposed Montana Justice and City
Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 MONT. L. REV. 197, 231 (1997).
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C. The 200 Don'ts
The statute mainly enumerates actions that violate the Act.
These enumerations frequently consist of general admonitions,
followed by particulars. Thus an act can be a violation even if it
is not specifically enumerated. The general admonitions relate to
(1) forbidden communications, (2) harassment or abuse, (3) false,
deceptive, or misleading representations, and (4) unfair or uncon-
scionable practices. We will look more closely at those admoni-
tions that may particularly affect attorneys.
1. Forbidden Communications
Section 804 is the "skip tracer" provision, regarding the debt
collector's communications in an attempt to locate the debtor.
Section 805(b), prohibits communication with persons other than
the consumer; however, for purposes of this section only, the
term consumer includes the consumer's spouse, parent (if the
consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator. 7
Under sections 804(6) and 805(a)(2), once the debt collector
knows the debtor is represented by an attorney, the debt collec-
tor must thereafter communicate with the attorney. Attorneys
should already know this rule from the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.'
Section 805(c) permits the debtor to notify the debt collector
in writing to cease all communications and the debt collector
must honor the request. If the debt collector is not an attorney,
this tactic may prompt the debt collector to turn the file over for
litigation. If the debt collector is an attorney who attempted to
collect the debt through litigation, must the attorney cease litiga-
tion efforts when she receives the section 805(c) notice? Such a
result would be perverse. So argued Heintz, raising this and
other "anomalies" in his attempt to persuade the Supreme Court
that the Act is ill-suited to attorneys. The argument failed, al-
though the Court acknowledged that the Act might need some
tweaking to fit the attorney's situation:
We need not authoritatively interpret the Act's conduct-regulat-
ing provisions now, however. Rather, we rest our conclusions
upon the fact that it is easier to read [section 805(c)] as con-
taining some such additional, implicit, exception than to believe
67. See FDCPA § 805(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d) (1994).
68. See MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 4.2.
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that Congress intended, silently and implicitly, to create a far
broader exception, for all litigating attorneys, from the Act
itself.9
Attorneys therefore need not literally comply with the Act, but
may invoke "implicit" exceptions necessitated by the circum-
stances of litigation.
2. Harassment or Abuse
Section 806 prohibits conduct that harasses, oppresses, or
abuses the consumer, and contains a non-exclusive list of acts
that violate the section. Because most of these "don'ts" reflect
common sense and professionalism, attorneys are unlikely to
violate them. For example, they know better than to threaten
violence or use obscene language. It may be a violation of this
section to threaten to report a bad check to the County Attorney;
the attorney is of course free to report it, but to threaten to re-
port it may constitute harassment. Another violation is the pub-
lication of "deadbeat" lists.70 Attorneys should be careful not to
circulate lists of consumer debtors other than to credit reporting
agencies.
3. False, Deceptive, or Misleading Representations
Section 807 prohibits false, deceptive, or misleading repre-
sentations, and contains a non-exclusive list of acts that violate
the section. For example, it is a violation of section 807(3) to
falsely represent or imply "that any individual is an attorney or
that any communication is from an attorney" and of section
807(5) to threaten "to take any action that cannot legally be
taken."71 Attorneys may unintentionally violate this section by
sending a collection letter to a state in which they are not admit-
ted to practice; for purposes of the statute, they are probably not
an attorney in that state. Occasionally attorneys have allowed
their names to be used by their debt collector clients, thereby
69. Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296-97 (1995).
70. See FDCPA § 806(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(3) (1994). The author has seen
these lists, or the bounced checks themselves, posted in public view at the cash reg-
isters of many businesses. This action does not violate the statute, as it is committed
by the creditor and not the debt collector, but it no doubt violates the common law
(see supra note 19) and perhaps the Montana Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer
Protection Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-133 (1997).
71. FDCPA § 807(3), (5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), (5) (1994).
72. See Rosa v. Gaynor, 784 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1989).
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misrepresenting the source of the collection letter. In one case,
where a lawyer allowed his name to be used by a collection agen-
cy to collect $9.42 for a magazine subscription, the plaintiff re-
covered $1,000 statutory damages against the attorney.73 Attor-
neys who fail to review a file before making a demand or who
misuse their letterhead may also face bar discipline.74
Attorneys also frequently violate section 807(5) by threaten-
ing "to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not
intended to be taken."75 For example, a threat to sue the debtor
if payment is not made within a certain period of time can be a
violation if the deadline is specious or if the attorney has no
intention of suing.7' If the attorney does in fact frequently begin
litigation when payment is not made, then of course the threat
can be made.
Attorneys also violate the Act by making misleading repre-
sentations as to the effect of litigation. Attorneys should not
enumerate post-judgment remedies without enumerating the
debtor's right to be heard in court and the existence of post-judg-
ment exemptions and due process protections. Attorneys who
bring lawsuits must watch out for violations of section 807(15),
which makes it a violation to falsely represent or imply that
documents do not require action by the consumer. For example,
service of a summons may induce the debtor to call and offer to
make payment if the suit is dropped. The attorney tells the debt-
or he does not need to respond to the suit. When full payment is
not made, the attorney then takes a default judgment. Although
it may be proper to take a default when no answer is received,
the attorney may have violated the Act by implying that the
debtor was not required to take action in response to the com-
plaint.
Because the FDCPA prohibits "deceptive" practices in § 807,
an issue often arises as to what standard should be used to de-
termine if collection messages are deceptive or misleading. In
Gammon v. GC Services,77 the debt collector mailed to Gammon
a form collection letter containing the following language:
Your account with American Express has been referred to us
for immediate attention.
73. See Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
74. See MONT. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 7.1, 7.5.
75. FDCPA § 807(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (1994).
76. See HOBBS, supra note 13, § 5.5.1.7.
77. 27 F.3d 1254 (7th Cir. 1994).
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You should know that we are an experienced collection agency.
We provided the systems used by a major branch of the federal
government and various state governments to collect delinquent
taxes.
We have collected millions of accounts from people in similar
circumstances. Now we intend to collect your debt. We know
what we are doing, and we are very efficient. We have handled
every kind of account-and dealt with every kind of excuse.
You must surely know the problems you will face later if you do
not pay. Send us your payment in full in the enclosed envelope,
which is directed to the post office box we maintain for Ameri-
can Express accounts."8
The issue was whether the debt collector violated section 807(1),
which provides that it is a violation to falsely represent or imply
"that the debt collector is vouched for.., or affiliated with the
United States or any State." The debt collector maintained that a
reasonable consumer would know that the debt collector was not
affiliated with the United States, but the trial court used the
"least sophisticated consumer" standard. 9 The appellate court
was somewhat troubled by that standard, for "[1]iterally, the
least sophisticated consumer is not merely 'below average,' he is
the very last rung on the sophistication ladder. Stated another
way, he is the single most unsophisticated consumer who ex-
ists."' The court rejected this literal interpretation and blended
in a reasonableness standard:
In maintaining the principles behind the enactment of the
FDCPA, we believe a simpler and less confusing formulation of
a standard designed to protect those consumers of below-aver-
age sophistication or intelligence should be adopted. Thus, we
will use the term, "unsophisticated," instead of the phrase,
"least sophisticated," to describe the hypothetical consumer
whose reasonable perceptions will be used to determine if col-
lection messages are deceptive or misleading. We reiterate that
an unsophisticated consumer standard protects the consumer
who is uninformed, naive, or trusting, yet it admits an objective
element of reasonableness. The reasonableness element in turn
shields complying debt collectors from liability for unrealistic or
peculiar interpretations of collection letters."'
78. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1255-56.
79. Id. at 1257.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Ninth Circuit has also adopted the least sophisticated consumer
standard with an objective twist. In Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Serv., Inc.,
869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989), the court stated:
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In an amusing concurring opinion, Judge Easterbrook ques-
tioned whether the "least sophisticated consumer" was an appro-
priate standard. He noted that, according to the tabloids, the
least sophisticated consumers actually believe that twelve Sena-
tors are from other planets, and observed:
[U]sing the "least sophisticated consumer" as the benchmark
would create big problems when determining whether the
plaintiff belongs to the class he purports to represent. Imagine
the deposition:
Q: Mr. Gammon, I see that you received a C in high school
English and read detective stories. How then can you be
included among the least sophisticated recipients of debt
collection notices?
A: Counsel, even my best friends will tell you that I am a
simpering fool.
Litigation to determine just how gullible the class representa-
tive is would not be enlightening. 2
4. Unfair or Unconscionable Practices
Section 808 prohibits unfair or unconscionable means of
collection, and contains a non-exclusive list of acts that violate
the section. One of the most significant is subsection (1), the
violation alleged in Jenkins v. Heintz:
The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee,
charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless
such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating
the debt or permitted by law.'
This section has been problematic when debt collectors try to
collect bad checks. In that situation, debt collectors frequently
seek to recover amounts beyond the face amount of the check.
For example, in Charles v. Lundgren & Associates, P.C.," plain-
Therefore, we evaluate the threatened conduct in the second notice under
the least sophisticated debtor standard. Although this standard is objective,
the standard is lower than simply examining whether particular language
would deceive or mislead a reasonable debtor.
Id. at 1227.
82. Gammon, 27 F.3d at 1259 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
83. FDCPA § 808(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) (1994).
84. 119 F.3d 739 (9th Cir. 1997). See supra text accompanying note 46 (discuss-
[Vol. 59
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tiff wrote a check for $17.93 to pay for a restaurant meal. When
the check bounced, the restaurant sent it to Check Rite for col-
lection. Check Rite demanded $42.93, then referred the matter to
defendant attorneys. The attorneys claimed plaintiff owed
$317.93 and offered to settle for $127.93. The court properly held
that the plaintiff stated a claim under the Act. 5 Unless an ex-
ception applies, the Act prohibits recovery of any amount greater
than the amount of the debt, $17.93. While the result is correct
under the Act, this rule provides little incentive for consumers to
honor their obligations, thus putting pressure on the states to
offer other relief to creditors.
Two exceptions to this rule allow a debt collector to recover
additional amounts: recovery is permissible if the amount is ex-
pressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permit-
ted by law. Prior to 1995, no statute in Montana authorized
service charges. Often businesses posted signs stating that an
additional charge would be added to a bad check. The issue un-
der the Act was whether these charges were "expressly autho-
rized by the agreement creating the debt."' This issue is now
largely mooted by section 27-1-717 of the Montana Code, which
permits the payee to add "a service charge in a reasonable
amount, not greater than $30," thus satisfying the alternative
requirement that the "amount is... permitted by law." 7 The
ing whether a bad check constitutes a debt).
85. See Charles, 119 F.3d at 742.
86. FDCPA § 808(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1) (1994). The author's opinion is that
such a sign does not expressly authorize the additional charge. See Scott J.
Burnham, Collection of a Dishonored Check in Montana, MONTANA LAWYER, Feb.
1986, at 6.
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-717 (1997) provides in full:
27-1-717. Issuing a bad check or stopping payment-civil liability
(1) A person who issues a check, draft, or order for the payment of mon-
ey is liable for a service charge, as provided in subsection (2), or for dam-
ages in a civil action, as provided in subsection (3), to the payee to whom
the check, draft, or order is issued, or the payee's assignee, if the check,
draft, or order is:
(a) dishonored for lack of funds or credit or because the issuer
has no account with the drawee; or
(b) issued in partial or complete fulfillment of a valid and legal-
ly binding obligation and the issuer stops payment with the intent
to fraudulently defeat a possessory lien or otherwise defraud the
payee of the check.
(2) The person who issues the check, draft, or order is liable to the pay-
ee or the payee's assignee for a service charge in a reasonable amount, not
greater than $30. The payee or the payee's assignee may waive the service
charge. Demand for the service charge must be made in writing by the
payee or the payee's assignee and mailed to the address shown on the
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issue remains whether a service charge of $30 may be recovered
in every event or whether the payee must prove that the charge
is reasonable.
To recover the service charge, the debt collector must satisfy
the notice requirement of the statute:
Demand for the service charge must be made in writing by the
payee or the payee's assignee and mailed to the address shown
on the check, draft, or order or to the issuer's last-known ad-
dress. The demand must state that the issuer is required to pay
the value of the check, draft, or order and service charge and
must state the service charge provided for in this section."
The statute further provides that, in addition to the service
charge, the creditor may recover substantial damages in a civil
action brought on a bad check. A creditor or debt collector claim-
ing charges arising under section 27-1-717 must be especially
wary to avoid violating the FDCPA. Although not clearly drafted,
the statute seems to permit the payee or the payee's assignee
check, draft, or order or to the issuer's last-known address. The demand
must state that the issuer is required to pay the value of the check, draft,
or order and service charge and must state the service charge provided for
in this section.
(3) The amount of damages awarded pursuant to subsection (1) must be
an amount equal to the service charge plus the greater of $100 or three
times the amount for which the check, draft, or order was issued. However,
damages may not exceed the value of the check, draft, or order by more
than $500.
(4) The remedy provided by subsection (3) is available only if-
(a) the payee or the payee's assignee has made the written
demand required in subsection (2) not less than 10 days before
commencing the action; and
(b) the issuer has failed to tender an amount of money equal to
the amount demanded under subsection (2) prior to the commence-
ment of the action.
(5) The remedy provided by this section:
(a) may be pursued notwithstanding the provisions of 27-1-312;
(b) may be pursued whether or not a criminal penalty is sought
under 45-6-316 or any other statute providing a criminal penalty;
and
(c) does not affect the obligation of the issuer provided for in
30-3-423 to pay the amount of the draft. However, in case of any
inconsistency with the provisions of Title 30, chapter 3, the provi-
sions of this section apply.
(6) Upon introduction by the payee or the payee's assignee of evidence
sufficient to establish the fact of mailing as required under subsection (2),
the failure to receive the written demand is not a defense to the action
allowed under subsection (3).
88. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-717(2) (1997).
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(often the debt collector) to recover substantial damages, but not
before the conditions precedent stated in subsection (4) have
occurred. First, the payee or assignee must make written de-
mand for the $30 service charge. Second, the debtor must not
have paid the amount demanded. Third, not less than 10 days
after making the written demand, the payee or assignee must
file a lawsuit.
A debt collector who demands an amount beyond the service
charge before a lawsuit is commenced would seem to violate the
FDCPA, for that amount is not due until a lawsuit is filed. On
the other hand, the debt collector would probably not violate the
Act if he or she warned the debtor that the debtor might ulti-
mately have to pay the charges. One caveat is that a debt collec-
tor violates the Act by threatening legal action if in fact legal ac-
tion is rarely undertaken.89 If the debt collector makes the
threat in an attempt to induce payment, it is important to state
correctly the possible charges. After a lawsuit has been filed, the
debt collector can demand the following amounts:
check less than $33.33: $100 + $30
check $33.34 to $235: 3 x amount of the check + $30
check greater than $235: amount of the check + $500
For example, assume that you are retained, like the attorneys in
Charles v. Lundgren & Associates, P.C., to recover on a bad
check in the amount of $17.93. You write a letter to the debtor
that states, "Montana Code Annotated § 27-1-717 provides that
you may be responsible for up to $500 in damages for issuing a
bad check." Although your statement is accurate as far as it
goes, you have violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by
not telling the whole story. When the amount of the check in
issue is $17.93, the statement is misleading, for in that case you
could recover only $130 under the statute and not $500.
D. Jurisdiction and Venue
According to section 813(d), FDCPA claims "may be brought
in any appropriate United States district court without regard to
the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction." Instead of bringing FDCPA claims affirmatively,
debtors usually raise them as counterclaims to the creditor's suit
89. Section 807(5) prohibits "[tihe threat to take any action that cannot legally
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on the debt. Because of the relatively small amounts involved,
these suits are often brought in courts of limited jurisdiction,
such as Justice Court. Some Justices of the Peace believe they
cannot entertain a claim based on federal law. Of course, they
are wrong, but you try to convince them.9" The debtor may in
fact gain an advantage if the Justice Court declines jurisdiction,
for the creditor's transaction costs will be substantially higher in
District Court.
Section 811(a) provides that legal action must be brought
only in the district where the consumer signed the contract or
where the consumer resides at the commencement of the action.
These venue requirements are narrower than the venue require-
ments for Justice Court jurisdiction.9 In perhaps a typical case,
James Crawford, a resident of Clay County, South Dakota,
sought medical services at the Yankton Medical Clinic in adja-
cent Yankton County.92 When he did not pay all charges, the
hospital assigned the account to defendant for collection. Defen-
dant filed a small claims action in Yankton county against
Crawford's wife, Glenda, who was then living in Minnehaha
County. The court held that the defendant violated the FDCPA
by bringing suit in the First Judicial District, where the hospital
was located, rather than in the Second Judicial District, where
the debtor resided. Although Glenda proved no actual damages,
the court awarded her $500 statutory damages plus $4,000 in
attorney's fees.
The venue restrictions probably apply to post-judgment exe-
cution, even though they are overly restrictive in that context.
For example, the Act may not permit an attorney to garnish a
consumer's earnings or attach her bank account when the earn-
ings or account are located in a judicial district other than the
ones where the consumer resides or signed the contract. Techni-
cally, if the consumer moves after legal proceedings have begun,
the judgment could not be enforced in the district where the
90. A Justice of the Peace reluctant to hear a federal statutory claim has the
right instincts, however, for these courts have historically considered common law
claims in which fairness and reasonableness were more central to the decision-mak-
ing process than the arcana of statutory interpretation. On the other hand, the
FDCPA lacks the technicalities of many statutes and often requires the judge to
determine what is fair.
91. See MONT. J. & CITY CT. R. Cv. P. 3 (1997). For example, Rule 3(AX2)(b)
provides that an action based on a contract may be brought in the county in which
the contract was to be performed.
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consumer currently resides, because it would not be the district
"in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the
action."
V. CIL LIABILrrY
The Act provides for actual damages and "additional" dam-
ages up to $1,000. The actual damages may include emotional
distress, damage to relationships and reputation, loss of income,
and telephone charges. They are rarely substantial. The addi-
tional damages serve the deterrent purposes of punitive damages
and the court may award them even if the debtor can prove no
actual damages. 93
Like many consumer protection statutes, the FDCPA pro-
vides the incentive of attorney's fees to encourage private attor-
neys to take what otherwise would be unrewarding cases and
thereby to do the public good.9' The court must award the fees
and may award them only to the consumer, not to the debt col-
lector. An exception arises if the court finds the consumer
brought the action in bad faith-a finding courts seem reluctant
to make.95 The statute thereby rarely deters debtors from bring-
ing claims. In the event of a settlement that is silent on
attorney's fees, the Ninth Circuit has held that the attorney did
not waive a claim for fees."
The liability portion of the statute provides for certain de-
fenses to FDCPA claims. One provides for a defense if the act
was done in conformity with an advisory opinion of the Federal
Trade Commission.97 This never happens, because there are no
advisory opinions.9" The more helpful defense is the bona fide
error defense:
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action
brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a
preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intention-
93. See, e.g., Baker v. G.C. Services Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. See Robert F. Koets, Annotation, Award of Attorneys' Fees under § 813(A)(3)
of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 132 A.L.R. FED. 477 (1996).
95. See, e.g., Swanson v. Southern Or. Credit Serv. Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th
Cir. 1988); Juras v. Aman Collection Serv., Inc., 829 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 875 (1988).
96. See Holland v. Roeser, 37 F.3d 501, 503 (9th Cir. 1994).
97. See FDCPA § 813(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(e) (1994).
98. The term "advisory opinion" is a term of art in FTC practice and procedure.
None has been issued under the FDCPA. The FTC staff issues informal letters, but
these are not binding. See HOBBS, supra note 13, § 7.6.
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al and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the
maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any
such error."
The bona fide error defense arose in a curious postscript to
the story of attorney Heintz that we began with. Having deter-
mined that the Act applied to Heintz, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case for determination of the substantive issues.
Back in district court, Heintz moved for summary judgment,
claiming that even if he had violated the Act, the violation was
the product of a bona fide error."° Because the alleged viola-
tion involved an unauthorized charge, Heintz and his law firm
had to prove, in the words of the district court, "by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that their attempt to collect the excess FPCI
fee was unintentional and that they maintained procedures that
were reasonably adapted to prevent the collection of unautho-
rized FPCI charges." 01 The court found that the law firm's ac-
tion was unintentional when it had no knowledge that the
charge was unauthorized by the loan contract and that its proce-
dures were reasonable when the obligations were verified by the
client. The court held that the debt collector was permitted un-
der the statute to rely on its client's representation that a charge
was valid and did not have to make an independent investiga-
tion.
0 2
The district court opinion was recently affirmed by a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals. °3 For purposes of the summary
judgment motion, the court assumed that the insurance placed
by the bank was not authorized by the contract."°4 Therefore,
absent the bona fide error defense, the law firm's attempt to
collect the charge violated the Act. The plaintiff claimed that as
a matter of fact, the attorneys knew the charge was impermissi-
ble. °5 The defendants claimed ignorance-the law firm only
knew what the bank told it."° The court found that because
the plaintiff could only prove that the defendants should have
known it, not that they actually knew it, there was no triable
99. FDCPA § 813(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (1994).
100. See Jenkins v. Heintz, No. 93C1332, 1996 WL 535167, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
18, 1996).
101. Id. at *3.
102. See Jenkins v. Heintz, 124 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
1304 (1998).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 828-29.
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issue of fact.'0 7
Plaintiff then argued that even if the lawyers didn't know,
by failing to find out they committed an error of legal judgment,
not the kind of clerical error excused by the statute.0 8 The
court reasoned that an attorney's liability for making a legal
judgment presupposes a duty to made a determination, here to
determine whether the debt was one that could be collected le-
gally.1°' The court imposed no such higher duty on an attorney
debt collector, finding that any debt collector is free to write a
demand letter based on the information it receives from a client,
accurate or not. 10
Finally, plaintiff argued that the bona fide error defense was
not available to Heintz's firm, but only to debt collectors who
maintain "procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such
error," in the words of section 813(c) of the FDCPA.' The
court summarized the law firm's procedures and found them ac-
ceptable.' The enumeration is a good checklist for attorneys
who may have to avail themselves of the defense:
The defendants have offered unrebutted evidence of the
procedures they followed when preparing to file suit to collect a
debt to avoid errors and omissions that could result in an
FDCPA violation. These include the publication of an in-house
fair debt compliance manual, updated regularly and supplied to
each firm employee; training seminars for firm employees col-
lecting consumer debts; and an eight-step, highly detailed pre-
litigation review process to ensure accuracy and to review the
work of firm employees to avoid violating the Act. After suit is
filed, the firm assigns an attorney to review all issues relating
to a particular deficiency, and stops all collection efforts on a
disputed balance before judgment to verify all disputed items
with the client."'
Again the court reasoned that adoption of these procedures is
sufficient; no independent investigation is required."4 In con-
clusion, the court reiterated that when the Supreme Court held
that attorneys were debt collectors under the statute, it recog-
107. See id. at 831-32.
108. See id. at 823.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 833.
111. Id. at 834 (citing FDCPA § 813(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c) (1994)).
112. See id.
113. Id. at 834.
114. See id. at 834-35.
203
25
Burnham: What Attorneys Should Know About the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, or, The 2 Do's and the 200 Don'ts of Debt Collection
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1998
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
nized that attorneys were bound by the same standards as other
debt collectors and no more.'15
In a strong dissent, Judge Ripple expressed concern that the
majority's application of the bona fide error defense would per-
mit attorneys to undo what the Supreme Court had done when it
brought them under the requirements of the Act."' Ripple
agreed with the plaintiff that while the defendants' procedures
might pick up clerical errors, nothing in the system was designed
to detect unauthorized amounts erroneously claimed by the cred-
itor."7 More significantly, he argued that lawyers are different
from other debt collectors because only lawyers can bring a law-
suit: "He is a debt collector who, because of the special tools at
his disposal, can violate the Act in especially potent ways." "'
Ripple's approach would still give lawyers the benefit of the bona
fide error defense for attempting to collect unauthorized
amounts, but only if their procedures are designed to detect this
kind of error.
It remains to be seen whether courts in other circuits will
follow the majority or the minority view. Again, attorneys wish-
ing to act prudently might take Judge Ripple's suggestion. In
establishing procedures, the firm might ask the client to break
the amount claimed into its component parts and to state the
source of each part. The firm could then determine whether each
part was authorized by the contract or other authority.
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article is to alert attorneys to the appli-
cability of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to their prac-
tices. This cuts two ways. Some plaintiff-oriented attorneys may
see in the Act an opportunity to serve consumers by identifying
claims that may be brought against their fellow attorneys. De-
fense-minded attorneys will see the need to take steps to reduce
exposure to such claims. The result may be for some time an
unfortunate game in which tremendous resources are brought to
bear and disproportionate losses are suffered because attorneys
catch each other in "technical" violations of the Act.
115. See id. at 835.
116. See id. at 835 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
117. See id. at 836.
118. Id. at 838. Earlier, Judge Ripple cited Judge Terence Evans' pithy remark,
"An unsophisticated consumer, getting a letter from an 'attorney,' knows the price of
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A similar game was played out some years ago after the
adoption of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)." 9 This situation
was ameliorated by a number of reforms. For one, the Federal
Reserve promulgated safe-harbor forms, use of which was a de-
fense to a claim under TILA. 2° Debt collectors, however, are
unlikely to accept legislative safe harbors. One of our premises is
that the greater the pressure brought to bear on debtors, the
more successful the results. Therefore, debt collectors will prob-
ably prove unwilling to trade their freedom to craft payment-
inducing techniques for the sanctity of a safe harbor. More likely,
the proliferation of trade associations and debt collection soft-
ware will satisfy the market for acceptable form language with-
out the need for legislation.12'
Another reform to the Truth in Lending Act was the limita-
tion that statutory damages, as opposed to actual damages,
would be imposed only for certain enumerated violations, which
were chosen because they were substantial rather than technical
violations."2 This approach would probably not work with the
FDCPA, for the prohibitions are phrased in general terms with
the enumerations being by way of example only. The same result
would be accomplished if courts paid closer attention to section
813(b)(1) of the FDCPA:
(B) In determining the amount of liability in any action under
subsection (a), the court shall consider, among other relevant
factors-
in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A), the
frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt
collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the ex-
tent to which such noncompliance was intentional;"
As the statute is structured, subsection (a) provides for actual
damages, statutory damages, and attorney's fees.12 Therefore,
the language in (b) authorizes the court to limit a defendant's
exposure to liability even where the defendant has clearly violat-
119. See, e.g., William E. Boyd, The Truth-In-Lending Simplification and Reform
Act-A Much-Needed Revision Whose Time Has Finally Come-Part 1, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1 (1981).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1994). The forms are found in 12 C.F.R. § 226,
App. H (1997). Because of the difficulty of compliance, the statute makes use of the
forms a defense even if the forms violate the law.
121. See any issue of Collector magazine for examples of both.
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (flush language following subsection (a)) (1994).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(bXl) (1994).
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (1994).
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ed the Act. The attorney who was unaware of the Act's applica-
tion and who did not abuse the debtor might well escape with an
appropriate slap on the wrist.
In a recent issue of Collector, the publication of the Ameri-
can Collectors Association, Stephen L. Albrecht, the Association's
director of Government Relations, railed against the exposure of
debt collectors, "who are feeling as if they have a target sign
painted across their backs that says 'Sue me.'" Albrecht wasn't
just a whiner, however. He had a plan for how collectors can
"strike back" against their oppressors-they can comply with the
Act!"2 He is, of course, quite right. Because reform of the Act is
unlikely, attorneys must find low-cost means of compliance.
The implications for attorneys are clear. First, attorneys
must realize that they may well be debt collectors. In cases of
doubt, the cost of compliance may be less than the cost of non-
compliance. Second, compliance is not that difficult. The two do's
are straightforward and easily assimilated into procedures. The
two hundred don'ts are more problematic, as they include many
don'ts that are not intuitive even to the attorney determined not
to take any actions that are unfair or deceptive. But because
collection generally involves repetitive steps, the proper proce-
dures and language can be incorporated into those steps. Joining
a trade association or purchasing collection software might be a
cost effective way to learn appropriate procedures and language.
Third, preventive steps can not only prevent violations but can
provide a defense if a violation occurs. Alert attorneys in the
firm to the problem so that every collection effort is undertaken
according to the same procedures and audit those procedures to
insure that they are reasonable. Finally, if an action is brought
against you and a violation is found, be in a strong position to
argue the bona fide error defense and the amelioration of liabili-
ty.
125. See Stephen L. Albrecht, Minimize Risk by Maximizing Compliance, COL-
LECTOR, Aug. 1997, at 18.
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